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Philosophy and
Depression
By Tim Ruggiero
This is a condensed
version of an article published by
Philosophical Society.com in June
2005. It is reprinted with permission.
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[Janet
Atkinson/Getty Images] |
A man of 35 years wakes up one day acutely aware of a vague anxiety, a
feeling of uneasiness, perhaps melancholy. He attributes the mood to
problems at work and to a broken relationship. Weeks, even months, pass,
but the subversive and unsettling "feeling" remains. There are slight
irregularities in his sleeping patterns and in his diet. He is less keen
on participating in various activities he once enjoyed. He is more
withdrawn, more subdued.
He looks out at the world and finds many things to detest: social
injustice, the trivialization of modern culture, the apathy of fellow
citizens, the slow pace at which society seems to reform itself. He
wishes people cared more about issues and ideas, and less about how they
look and how much money they have. He wonders, occasionally, if he isn't
a crank, a weirdo, a malcontent. He reminds (and thus reassures) himself
that he has a job, some savings, a friend or two and a family.
Another six or seven months pass, and this destabilizing feeling
metamorphoses into profound despair. He sees nothing in life which is
fulfilling or even mildly satisfying. His relationships, for the most
part, are insubstantial and transient. He's nearly convinced that life
has no real "meaning"; he even contemplates suicide.
Should this man be drugged up on Prozac or Zoloft? Should he spend years
on a therapist's couch trying to figure out what's wrong? Should he
expect mitigation to come from the wisdom of self-help gurus or from the
counsel of pastors and priests?
There is no reason to dismiss pharmaceutical solutions out of hand.
Medicines of all kinds pass intense scrutiny, have to meet various
guidelines before ever making it to market, and are monitored ever
carefully after their debut. The verdict on drugs like Prozac has long
since been out, and many report dramatic improvement in lifestyle.
The life of a man who has tried to cut his wrists or poison himself
could very well be saved by lithium or fluoxetine or MAO inhibitors.
This brute fact seems to render all further discussion on the subject
irrelevant. Why should the nuances of social pathology matter to the
person who seeks merely to attenuate his own depression? If relief can
be obtained by a monthly regimen of pills, why philosophize? Why lose
oneself in a labyrinth of psychoanalytic interpretation? Why question
society or seek to change that which cannot be changed?
These questions have a force and a momentum all their own, but they do
not anticipate the unlikeliest of reactions: that depression isn't
some evil that needs to be extirpated from the mind or some disease that
needs to be palliated by drugs; that it might be an embodiment of
philosophical pessimism, a natural reaction to one's social surroundings
and situation. Imagine if the term were defined non-pejoratively, even
positively:
| "Depression, in most of its
manifestations, is the healthy suspicion that 1) there may
not be an aim or point to existence, and/or 2) that the life
people have actually created, the 'structure of society,' is
not one worth participating in. The objective should not be
to kill this suspicion, but to tame it and work with it." |
An Existential Question
Such a definition would naturally be derided by professionals and
experts everywhere, declared at once to be irresponsible and inaccurate.
The statement above, however, humanizes the depressed state and rightly
sees the question about life's meaning as possibly the most important a
person can ask, and a negative answer to it as at least as plausible as
any naively affirmative one. "In most of its manifestations" allows for
the fact that some depressions may necessitate immediate pharmaceutical
intervention (e.g., when the risk of suicide is high).
There are two other advantages to the statement above. First, it
supports the widely held view that depression can sometimes occupy the
same intersection of the psyche as genius. Philosophers such as John
Stuart Mill, William James and Friedrich Nietzsche suffered the worst
throes of depression. A host of other artists and writers suffered the
same fate, including Edgar Allan Poe, William Blake, Mark Twain,
Wolfgang Mozart, Charles Dickens, Vincent van Gogh, T. S. Eliot, Ernest
Hemingway and Sylvia Plath.
Second, it begs reflective souls to consider the meaningfulness of
experience and challenges them to let go of simplistic notions of
depression. It also provokes them to consider whether a depressed state
isn't to some extent rational and objectively warranted.
R. D. Laing, a radical psychotherapist who identified with various sects
of existentialism, believed the goal of psychotherapy should not be to
reconcile patients to norms which may themselves be unhealthy, but to
blaze a path in the direction of transcendence.
Our environment can either open up or constrict possibilities for
spiritual and intellectual growth. In The Politics of Experience
Laing offers a fine passage from sociologist Erving Goffman's study
Encounters:
"There seems to be no agent more effective than another person in
bringing a world for oneself alive, or, by a glance, a gesture, or a
remark, shriveling up the reality in which one is lodged."
A pessimist and existentialist might, in fact, agree that the world
itself is screwed up, that social norms are themselves pathological,
that feelings of despair, anxiety, loss and pointlessness may be typical
in people who are exceptionally intelligent and observant. A person who
is "depressed" may thus, on this view, see things others don't see, have
keen insight into the waywardness of modern culture, have a refined
sense of the good and the beautiful. Drugging a person would therefore
dim his vision, desensitize his perception, kill the penchant to search
for meanings.
What is the practical import of this? That the best and truest therapy
may consist in examining the condition or state itself, with
understanding being the chief goal, not any simple fixes or meliorative
expediencies; in locating the etiology somewhere in the ebb and flow of
social relationships, realizing that some of the most brilliant people
who ever lived were depressed, and that no super drug is effective
enough to eradicate the ills of culture and modern society.
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Tim Ruggiero
is a freelance writer and the editor of Philosophical
Society.com. |
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