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Toward a Nuclear-Free Arctic

By Adele Buckley

In August 2007, the Canadian Pugwash Group published a call for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Arctic, a proposal supported by other antinuclear activists and echoed by SGI President Ikeda in his 2008 annual peace proposal. Dr. Adele Buckley, past chair of the Canadian Pugwash Group, explores steps toward the realization of this vision.

photo Three polar bears approach a U.S. nuclear submarine that has surfaced near the North Pole  [U.S. Navy photo by Chief Yeoman Alphonso Braggs]

The opening of Arctic waters creates enormous profit potential from shorter international trade routes and access to seabed oil, gas and marine resources.

The Law of the Sea gives countries territorial jurisdiction within 200 nautical miles of their coast, but outside these zones nations are taking measures to ensure access, rights and, in some cases, sovereignty over portions of the seabed. Territorial claims and counterclaims will be a source of tension that could degenerate into open conflict.

Naval operations of both Russia and the United States, the two nuclear powers in the region, will increase when there are open waters, creating a potential for military confrontation, especially because both have nuclear-armed submarines. Nowhere else are the two major nuclear powers in such close proximity to each other. There is a potential for additional nuclearization of both sea and land.

Nuclear weapons in the region present a multifaceted danger to the Arctic lands and peoples, and preventive measures must be taken before it is too late. The creation of legal structures and procedures is already beginning to be discussed, and it is important that nuclear weapons issues are put on that agenda; otherwise the status quo will become ingrained. Existing agreements and the present status in the Arctic provide a hopeful start because:

  • There is a seabed treaty in force that prevents stationing of nuclear weapons on the Arctic Ocean floor.
  • Strategic bombers in Arctic airspace are much less significant now than during the Cold War.
  • Negotiations could begin now on military confidence-building measures. Of note is the Antarctic Treaty, where each contracting party has the right to send observers to every base of any country in that region, thus producing a very powerful confidence-building measure for ensuring full compliance.
  • It is hoped that strategic arms reduction talks between the U.S. and Russia will begin again.

There are, however, serious obstacles to a nuclear weapon-free Arctic. The United States and Russia both regularly deploy nuclear-capable submarines in Arctic waters. Russia's naval base at Zapadnaya Litsa maintains their most advanced ballistic missile submarines, and patrol areas are mainly in the Arctic. Thus, negotiations for an Arctic Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) could only be attempted after complementary disarmament measures by the United States.

There is new mainstream support for abolition. Former high-level officials in the U.S., U.K., Italy, Germany and others have called for immediate comprehensive steps to reduce the nuclear danger, continuing to abolition of nuclear weapons. A conference at the Hoover Institute in the U.S. in October 2007 recommended a 500-warhead limit for both the U.S. and Russia. If such a reduction were to be achieved, it would be in the best interests of Russia to place its reliance on mobile land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The result could be closure of nuclear submarine facilities in the Arctic, or alternatively, retention of nuclear-powered submarines not outfitted with nuclear arms. Either of these alternatives would clear the way for a NWFZ in the Russian Arctic.

The Russian Reality

A most important distinction between Russia and the other Arctic nations is that Russia has nearly 4 million people in the region, and many are not indigenous. The geopolitical reality, as seen from Russia, is that military security is inseparable from energy security. In preparation for greatly enhanced activity in the Arctic, billions of dollars have been or will be spent by both the East (Russia) and the West (U.S. and Canada) for icebreakers, Arctic patrol ships, oil platforms, army bases and similar equipment and infrastructure. At present, Russia appears better prepared than the West.

Over a 14-year period, five Central Asian states negotiated the Central Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ), assisted by the UN. The 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk, which has not entered into force, involves former nuclear weapon states that have agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency site visits for inspection and verification. Only Russia and China, so far, are signatories to the protocol respecting the CANWFZ. The CANWFZ offers experience applicable to an Arctic NWFZ: negotiations require a significant period of time. Work should start now.

A Regional Treaty

A potentially productive approach would be for all nonnuclear Arctic states to work together on a regional treaty, as allowed for in Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, "to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their respective territories." Norway, Sweden and Finland, all with sovereign territory north of the Arctic Circle, are nuclear weapon-free. Greenland has a U.S. military base at Thule, but Denmark is a nonnuclear weapon state (NNWS). Canada is already a de facto nuclear-free country. The Northwest Passage, a shipping channel which passes many islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, is a very unfavorable passageway for submarines because it is narrow and shallow, posing severe difficulty to both the maneuverability and undetectability of a submarine. This passage is very probably a de facto nuclear weapon-free zone. Regarding surface travel through the Northwest Passage, maritime safety in these dangerous waters would certainly dictate obtaining an international agreement to ban nuclear fissile materials.

Declaring only a portion of the Arctic regions and waters to be a NWFZ could be problematic. On the other hand, partial solutions, taken together, could be the right path.

For the reasons outlined above, it is a realistic hope that the two nuclear weapon states in the region will make significant reductions in their nuclear arms, creating the negotiating atmosphere that would allow them to turn their attention to an Arctic NWFZ.

The issue of a NWFZ is central to the Arctic security environment. Arctic peoples have a right to be secure from nuclear weapons stationed on their land or in their seas.

photo An abandoned Early Warning Radar Site on the icecap of Greenland  [Struthious Bandersnatch, GNU]

Declaring a partial NWFZ in Canada, in the Northwest Passage, would be difficult because it would focus attention on assertions by the U.S. and others that it is an international waterway, whereas the mutual benefit of both Canada and the U.S. would be to keep the status quo. In this reality, it would be easier for the Canadian government to designate the whole of Canada as a NWFZ.

Such a legislative act by Canada would show persuasive leadership, leading to a regional treaty between all the NNWS in the Arctic. The cumulative effect would model the process for the United States and Russia.

Once the NWFZ in Africa enters into force, as now expected, 110 countries, including the entire southern hemisphere, will be protected by NWFZs. Each NWFZ is unique, with different terms of agreement. This is a helpful precedent in that both the U.S. and Russia could, with the right political will, designate only their territories north of the Arctic Circle as nuclear weapon-free, without having to change other nuclear security strategies.

Comparison with the legal and political framework of the Antarctic is of interest, although the situation differs greatly. In 1991, the Madrid Protocol designated Antarctica as a natural reserve devoted to peace and science, and prohibited mining exploration activities indefinitely. Environmental protection, wisely seen to be necessary in the Antarctic, might serve as a useful starting point in the Arctic too.

The challenges of opening the Arctic are unprecedented. Providing an equitable governance regime calls for a high degree of international cooperation and a resolution of rivalries. An Arctic Treaty would reduce conflict and provide an opportunity to embed the expectation of a NWFZ. An Arctic NWFZ, introduced conceptually in the near future, could gradually gain support. It would be a significant step toward disarmament, and would build confidence toward a nuclear weapon-free world.

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Dr. Adele Buckley is a physicist, engineer and environmental scientist. She is a member of the Pugwash Council, a cofounder and former vice president of MDS Sciex, and formerly vice president of technology & research at the Ontario Centre for Environmental Technology Advancement.

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